

October 24, 1962

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TO : The Secretary  
THROUGH: S/S  
FROM : S/P - W. W. Rostow  
SUBJECT: Summitry

Mac Bundy relayed to me yesterday a Presidential request that we should prepare, as a matter of urgency, a memorandum on what our response should be to a Soviet or other proposal for a Summit. Such a memorandum is attached for your transmission to the President.

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Attachment:

As stated.

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Clearance:

EUR  
Ambassador Thompson  
G - Mr. Johnson

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Summitry

Attached is the planning paper on U.S. response to a Summit invitation which Mr. Roetow was asked to prepare.

Dean Rusk

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October 25, 1962

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Summit

1. The Problem:

How should the US respond to a Soviet or other proposal for a Summit?

2. Proposal:

The US should, after consultation with its allies, accept an invitation for a Summit. It should not insist on pre-Summit removal of MRBM's, since this would generally be viewed as torpedoing any Summit proposal. It should make clear, however, that:

(a) The US is not going to the Summit to negotiate about whether Soviet MRBM's should remain in Cuba. Removal of those MRBM's is an urgent necessity; if their removal is not agreed at the Summit, the US will take urgent action to effect that removal. And the US will not remove its "quarantine" while the MRBM's are in Cuba.

(b) The agenda of the Summit should include not only removal of MRBM's from Cuba but also other issues generating East-West tensions - notably Berlin, Germany, and arms control.

This recommendation assumes no blockage of access. We should not go to a Summit while any such blockage exists, but rather try to secure prior removal of blockage through lower level diplomatic action. We should avoid thus seeming

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to accept symmetry between Cuba and Berlin.

3. Dissonance:

The predominant Soviet motive in seeking or agreeing to a Summit would probably be to diffuse the current crisis in such a way to weaken the US resolve, create increased obstacles to US action, and thus indefinitely prolong the presence of Soviet MRBM's in Cuba. The U.S. should not respond to any Summit invitation in such a way as to facilitate attainment of this Soviet purpose. The US should make clear that it is fixed in its resolve to remove MRBM's and will not brook long delay.

If the Soviets could be made to see this clearly, there is just a bare possibility that a Summit Meeting might be an occasion for a turn-around of some significance of Soviet policy.

Khrushchev had in recent months given us a number of reasons to believe that he might be at a crossroads in policy. The Cuba MRBM deployment represents his attempt to explore the "hard" fork in the road. If he is rebuffed in this attempt, and if interesting opportunities - if only of an atmospheric level - for useful East-West negotiation are simultaneously opened up to him in other areas, he may conceivably be tempted to explore the alternative option.

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4. Outcomes:

In the light of these considerations, the specific business at a Summit might be along the following lines:

(a) Arms Control. There might be an exchange of declarations in respect to MNM deployment which would have the effect of pulling MNMs out of Cuba. There might also be an exchange of declarations on non-diffusion.

(b) Berlin: We would make clear to Khrushchev that the troop issue was non-negotiable but that we were prepared to reach a "Solution C" type agreement which did not purport to be a final Berlin settlement but put the matter on ice and allowed East Germans to substitute for the Soviets in access functions. This could be dressed up in various ways - UN observer, no nuclear arms in Berlin, etc. - for face-saving purposes. At most, the heads of government could probably reach agreement on the basic principles involved and direct their foreign ministers to work out the details and report back to a later Summit.

(c) Germany. The heads of government might agree on, or direct the foreign ministers to pursue, the items on

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Germany in our "coeur vivant": mixed commissions to increase inter-German contacts, and declarations regarding non-use of force to change the demarcation line and change the external frontiers.

(d) Future Summitry. The heads of government could agree to meet again to review the foreign ministers' deliberations on Berlin and Germany and to consider new topics, e.g., NATO and Warsaw Pact non-aggression declarations, which might be more appropriately handled in a more relaxed atmosphere. Precisely because we now have so little to offer Khrushchev in the substantive field, we should seek to offer him procedural innovations which might make the path of negotiation more attractive.

This is an optimistic view of the outcome. Alternatively, given the fact that there is no real give in our position on Soviet MRBM's in Cuba and Western troops in Berlin, the Summit might fail in such a way as significantly to increase world concerns.

5. Timing: In selecting the date for a Summit, at least two considerations should be borne in mind:

(a)

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(c) We would not want the date to be so far off as to erode or make less credible our resolve soon to take action to remove MRMs from Cuba. An early Summit would, moreover, help to choke off early Soviet counter-moves over Berlin.

(b) We would not want the date to be so soon as to preclude pre-Summit consultation with our allies (including the Turks and Italians if any prior statements by them regarding their IRM's is intended).

6. Consultation. If the position outlined above is accepted, we should immediately move to consult with our allies about a Summit, since a Soviet or other proposal can be expected in the near future. It is essential that we build an effective record of consultation in this crisis; and Summitry offers a useful subject on which to begin.

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**DRAFT FOLLOWS**



October 25, 1962

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Summit

1. The Problem:

How should the US respond to a Soviet or other proposal for a bilateral Summit?

2. Proposal:

The US should, after consultation with its allies, accept an invitation for a Summit. It should not insist on pre-Summit removal of Soviet offensive weapons from Cuba, since this would generally be viewed (with some justice) as torpedoing any Summit proposal. The US should make clear, however, that:

(a) The US is not going to the Summit to negotiate about whether Soviet offensive weapons remain in Cuba. Removal of those offensive weapons is an urgent necessity; if their removal is not agreed at the Summit, the US will take urgent action to effect that removal. The US will not remove its "quarantine" while the offensive weapons are in Cuba, and may well extend it unless UN inspection can assure us against a continuing build-up in Cuba.

(b) The

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(b) The agenda of the Summit should include not only removal of MRBMs from Cuba but also other issues generating East-West tensions.

### 3. Discussion:

The predominant Soviet motive in seeking or agreeing to a Summit would probably be to diffuse the current crisis in such a way to weaken the US resolve, create increased obstacles to US action, and thus indefinitely prolong the presence of Soviet MRBMs in Cuba. The US should not respond to any Summit invitation in such a way as to facilitate attainment of this Soviet purpose. The US should make clear that it is fixed in its resolve to remove MRBM's and will not brook long delay.

If the Soviets could be made to see this clearly, there is just a bare possibility that a Summit Meeting might be an occasion for a turn-around of some significance of Soviet policy.

Khrushchev had in recent months given us a number of reasons to believe that he might be at a crossroads in policy. The Cuba MRBM deployment represents his attempt to explore the "hard" fork in the road. If he is rebuffed in this attempt, and if interesting opportunities - if only of an atmospheric level - for useful East-West negotiation are simultaneously opened up to him in other areas, he may conceivably be tempted to explore the alternative option.

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(c) Germany. The heads of government might similarly direct their foreign ministers to pursue with other interested parties the items on Germany in our "modus vivendi": mixed commissions to increase inter-German contacts, and declarations regarding non-use of force to change the demarcation line and change the external frontiers.

(d) Future summitry. The heads of government could agree to invite the heads of the UK and French government to meet with them at some future date to review the foreign ministers' deliberations on Berlin and Germany and to consider new topics, e.g., NATO and Warsaw Pact non-aggression declarations, which might be more appropriately handled in a more relaxed atmosphere.

This is an optimistic view of the outcome. Alternatively,

given the

fact that there is no real give in our position on Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba and Western troops in Berlin, the Summit might fail in such a way as significantly to increase world concerns.

5. Timing: In selecting the date for a Summit, at least two considerations should be borne in mind:

(a) We would not want the date to be so far off as to erode or make less credible our resolve soon to take action to remove Soviet offensive weapons from Cuba. An early Summit might, moreover, help to choke off Soviet counter-moves over Berlin.

(b) We would not want the date to be so soon as to preclude pre-Summit consultation with our allies.

6. Consultation. If the position outlined above is accepted, we should immediately move to consult with our allies about a Summit, since a Soviet or other proposal can be expected in the near future. It is essential that we build an effective record of consultation in this crisis; and Summitry offers a useful subject on which to begin.